The future of feedback: Motivating performance improvement through future-focused feedback.

Managerial feedback discussions often fail to produce the desired performance improvements. Three studies shed light on why performance feedback fails and how it can be made more effective. In Study 1, managers described recent performance feedback experiences in their work settings. In Studies 2 and 3, pairs of managers role-played a performance review meeting. In all studies, recipients of mixed and negative feedback doubted the accuracy of the feedback and the providers' qualifications to give it. Disagreement regarding past performance was greater following the feedback discussion than before, due to feedback recipients' increased self-protective and self-enhancing attributions. Managers were motivated to improve to the extent they perceived the feedback conversation to be focused on future actions rather than on past performance. Our findings have implications for the theory and practice of performance management.

Skilled or unskilled, but still unaware of it: how perceptions of difficulty drive miscalibration in relative comparisons.

People are inaccurate judges of how their abilities compare to others'. J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999, 2002) argued that unskilled performers in particular lack metacognitive insight about their relative performance and disproportionately account for better-than-average effects. The unskilled overestimate their actual percentile of performance, whereas skilled performers more accurately predict theirs. However, not all tasks show this bias. In a series of 12 tasks across 3 studies, the authors show that on moderately difficult tasks, best and worst performers differ very little in accuracy, and on more difficult tasks, best performers are less accurate than worst performers in their judgments. This pattern suggests that judges at all skill levels are subject to similar degrees of error. The authors propose that a noise-plus-bias model of judgment is sufficient to explain the relation between skill level and accuracy of judgments of relative standing.

Overconfidence in interval estimates.

Judges were asked to make numerical estimates (e.g., "In what year was the first flight of a hot air balloon?"). Judges provided high and low estimates such that they were X% sure that the correct answer lay between them. They exhibited substantial overconfidence: The correct answer fell inside their intervals much less than X% of the time. This contrasts with choices between 2 possible answers to a question, which showed much less overconfidence. The authors show that overconfidence in interval estimates can result from variability in setting interval widths. However, the main cause is that subjective intervals are systematically too narrow given the accuracy of one's information-sometimes only 40% as large as necessary to be well calibrated. The degree of overconfidence varies greatly depending on how intervals are elicited. There are also substantial differences among domains and between male and female judges. The authors discuss the possible psychological mechanisms underlying this pattern of findings.